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ABSTRACT
We develop a model of intergenerational educational mobility incorporating gender bias
against girls in the family, school, and labor market. Mobility and investment equations from
the model are estimated for India using data not truncated by coresidency. The standard
linear model misses important heterogeneity and yields misleading conclusions. Daughters
of uneducated fathers face lower relative and absolute mobility (rural and urban). We find
gender equality in absolute mobility for children of urban college educated fathers, but not
in rural areas. Theoretical insights help understand the mechanisms. Parental nonfinancial
inputs, unwanted girls, and patrilineal states are important for explaining the findings.
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(1) Introduction
Gender bias against girls in developing countries has been the focus of a large economic
literature (for excellent surveys, see World Bank (2012), Duflo (2012)). India has been un-
der the microscope in many of these studies reporting evidence of gender bias against girls,
for example, in health (Jayachandran and Pande (2017)), education expenditure (Azam and
Kingdon (2013)), breast feeding (Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011)), and a skewed sex ratio
because of sex selection (Sen (1990)).2 In contrast, the gender gap (boys-girls) in schooling in
India has gone down substantially over the decades. The gender gap in gross enrollment ratios
for the grades 1-8 was 30.1 percent in 1981, but India achieved near gender parity in 2011
with a gap of only 1.2 percent.3 Estimates based on the India Human Development Survey
(IHDS) 2012 data show a gender gap of 3 years of schooling for the 1950s birth cohort, which
declined to a gap of 0.60 years of schooling for the 1990s and later birth cohorts.4 The gains
toward gender parity in schooling seem incompatible with the extensive evidence of gender
bias noted above. Does gender convergence in schooling attainment imply that the girls in
the younger generation in India enjoy equal educational opportunities as the boys?
To analyze this question, we study intergenerational educational persistence in India with
a focus on the implications of gender bias in the family, school and labor market. A bur-
geoning literature in economics and sociology analyzes inequality in economic opportunities
of children by estimating intergenerational persistence in indicators of economic status. The
focus of this literature is on understanding the role of family background in shaping the life
chances of a child. A vast literature on developed countries primarily focuses on intergener-
ational persistence in permanent income. In contrast, the literature on developing countries
largely focuses on education because the required panel data on income are not available.
Although both intergenerational mobility and gender bias have been active research areas in
economics, there is little work at the intersection of these two. Most of the available studies of
intergenerational mobility focus on the father-son linkage, and research on women in general,
and gender bias in particular, remains scarce.5
2Estimates for the 1990s suggest 39.1 million women were missing in India (Klasen and Wink (2003)).
3Estimates from Statistics of School Education 2011-2012, Government of India.
4In most developing countries, girls have historically lagged behind boys in educational attainment. How-
ever, the gender gap is narrowing over time and a reverse gender gap has emerged in Latin America in
educational attainment (Grant and Behrman (2010)).
5Among the available contributions on intergenerational mobility of daughters, see Chadwick and Solon
(2002) on the USA, Azam (2016) on India. Azomahou and Yitbarek (2021) find that relative educational
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We need to address two major challenges to understand whether the girls in the younger
generation in India face unequal educational opportunities despite the recent gains in schooling
attainment. First, most of the household surveys use coresidency to define household mem-
bership and the resulting sample truncation from the missing nonresident members causes
upward bias in the estimates of relative mobility.6 More importantly, the gender gap is likely
to be severely underestimated because the upward bias is significantly higher for girls (Emran
et al. (2018)). To overcome this, we use data from India Human Development Survey (IHDS,
2012) which do not suffer from any significant sample truncation. The second challenge is
that it is difficult to interpret the evidence when the estimating equations are not derived
from a theoretical model (Mogstad (2017)).7 To address this, we develop a model of inter-
generational educational mobility in the tradition of Becker and Tomes (1986) incorporating
gender bias against girls in the family, school, and labor market. We show that the workhorse
linear mobility equation implies no gender gap in relative mobility even when the parents
have son preference and systematically underestimate the academic ability of a daughter.
Without the guidance of the theory, a researcher relying on the standard linear model would
(incorrectly) conclude that there is no gender bias when relative mobility is not significantly
different between sons and daughters. This paper provides the first theoretically grounded
empirical analysis of the extent, sources, and consequences of gender bias for intergenerational
educational mobility in a developing country. Our focus is on the younger generation in India
who went to school during the 1990s to 2010s.
The model of intergenerational educational persistence in this paper captures different
sources of gender bias against girls. The most common sources of gender bias in the family
are: (i) biased parental estimates of academic ability, (ii) lower weight to the welfare of a
daughter compared to that of a son (“pure son preference”), and (iii) lower expected returns
mobility is lower for girls in 7 out of 9 African countries in their sample, and Alesina et al. (2019) provide
estimates of absolute educational mobility for both men and women in 27 African countries. But these papers
do not study the sources of gender gap. For evidence on intergenerational transmission of gender attitudes in
India, see Dhar et al. (2019).
6For education, relative mobility is measured by persistence in schooling attainment across generations,
usually estimated as the slope parameter of a regression of children’s schooling on parent’s schooling. Relative
mobility = 1- slope; thus, higher persistence implies lower relative mobility. In a perfectly mobile society, there
is no persistence (a zero slope), implying that father’s education is immaterial for educational opportunities
of children.
7Most of the recent studies on intergenerational educational mobility do not derive the estimating equations
from theory. The only exception we are aware of is Card et al. (2018) on the USA, but their focus is not
gender bias.
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to a daughter’s education. The expected returns may in part reflect gender bias in the labor
market.8 These factors affect financial investment in education of daughters, but gender
differences can also be important in nonfinancial impacts of parents’ education such as role
model effect and home tutoring. Another important concern is unfavorable school environment
faced by the girls; for example, the absence of toilets for girls can result in dropouts when a
girl reaches puberty.
The conditional expectation function (CEF) of children’s education (years of schooling)
given parental education is assumed to be linear in the existing studies on intergenerational
educational mobility we are aware of. In a Becker-Tomes model with self-financing constraint,
the intergenerational educational mobility equation is linear when the education production
function has constant returns. This “linear model” of intergenerational educational mobility,
however, yields strong predictions: parental bias against girls in financial investment arising
from pure son preference and biased estimates of ability does not affect relative mobility; the
effects of parental biases are captured by the intercept of the regression function.9 When
education production function exhibits diminishing returns, the estimating equation for inter-
generational educational mobility is concave in parental schooling.10 In contrast to the linear
model, parental gender bias in financial investment affects both relative and absolute educa-
tional mobility when diminishing returns are important.11 In the absence of biases against
girls, we expect no significant gender gaps in both relative and absolute mobility, and girls
enjoy equal educational opportunities.
The main conclusions from our empirical analysis are as follows.12 Evidence rejects the
8However, a substantial body of evidence on India shows that returns to education are higher for girls,
even though there is substantial gender wage gap in the labor market. The wage gap reflects a lower base for
the girls.
9The sharp implications of the linear model for gender bias in intergenerational educational mobility have
not been noted before, to the best of our knowledge.
10To our knowledge, the quadratic intergenerational educational persistence equation was first derived by
Becker et al. (2015). Our set-up is different from theirs in three ways. First, the complementarity and
convexity emphasized by Becker et al. (2015) is unlikely to be important in a country such as India. Evidence
below shows that the mobility function is concave in both rural and urban India. Second, our modeling of
the credit constraint is different (section 3 below). Third, Becker et al. (2015) do not explore gender bias in
intergenerational mobility.
11For education, absolute mobility is measured by the expected years of schooling of a child conditional on
parent’s education which depends on both the intercept and the slope of the mobility equation. Even when
there is no significant gender gap in relative mobility (slope measure), we can have substantial gender gap in
absolute mobility because of differences in the intercepts.
12An advantage of the approach developed in this paper is that the conclusions regarding the nature of
gender bias and its implications for intergenerational educational mobility pertain to the whole population of
3
widely used linear model of intergenerational educational persistence in both rural and urban
India. The mobility CEF is concave irrespective of gender and location, implying heteroge-
neous relative mobility across the distribution of father’s schooling. Girls face lower relative
mobility when the father has low education but there is no significant gender gap for the
children of fathers with college education, both in urban and rural areas. If one relies on the
standard linear model, the estimates lead to the incorrect conclusion that girls face substan-
tially lower relative mobility even when the fathers are college educated. Evidence suggests
that absolute mobility is also lower for girls born to fathers with low education irrespective of
location, but the gender gap closes only in the urban areas when the father is college educated.
The girls born into low educated households are thus doubly disadvantaged: they face lower
relative and absolute mobility, and this is true in both rural and urban areas.
The evidence, interpreted in terms of the theory, helps uncover some of the underlying
mechanisms: (i) girls face unfavorable school environments in both rural and urban India; (ii)
there is pure son preference in rural India, but the estimates are not informative in urban
India; and (iii) parent’s direct (nonfinancial) impact is stronger for girls in urban households.
The analysis of the mechanisms based on a linear model leads us astray, implying no son
preference in rural India. Evidence from the first child sample suggests that the phenomenon
of “unwanted girls” is important in accounting for gender gap in educational opportunities
in India.13 A lower incidence of unwanted girls and a higher impact of parental nonfinancial
inputs on girls provide plausible explanations for the gender parity in absolute mobility in
college educated households in urban India. Strikingly, the evidence indicates no statistically
significant gender bias in intergenerational educational persistence in the matrilineal states in
India, suggesting a central role of the patrilineal and patrilocal Hindu kinship system in the
observed gender differences at the national level. The approach developed in this paper is of
wider interest as it can be fruitfully used in other developing countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the related literature
with a focus on India, and put the contributions of this paper in perspective. The next section
develops a theoretical model that incorporates gender bias in both financial investment and
interest.
13“Unwanted girls” are the girls who would have been aborted as foetus if ultrasonography technology was
available and affordable to the parents. In India, the use of ultrasonography was limited during our study
period, and as a consequence many parents had unwanted girls. See section (10) below.
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nonfinancial inputs by parents, and also in the labor market (returns to education) and school.
Section 4 discusses the measures of relative and absolute mobility in a concave mobility model.
Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of the data, sample construction, and summary statistics.
Section 6 reports and discusses the estimates of the investment and mobility equations for
urban India, along with an analysis of how the estimated parameters can help sort out the
underlying mechanisms. Section 7 is devoted to a similar analysis for rural India. Robustness
checks for alternative age ranges are contained in section 8. Section 9 offers a discussion
on the pitfalls of the maintained assumption of linearity. The following section provides an
analysis of the role played by unwanted girls. Section 11 reports the estimates for patrilineal
vs. matrilineal states. The last section (section 12) concludes with a summary of the main
findings and the methodological contributions of the paper.
(2) Related Literature
The literature on intergenerational mobility in developed countries is extensive, with many
fundamental theoretical and empirical contributions. For excellent surveys of the literature,
please see Solon (1999), Black and Devereux (2011), and Bjorklund and Salvanes (2011). The
focus of this literature has been on intergenerational (permanent) income persistence, and a
lot of effort has been devoted to understanding the biases that arise from measurement error
and life-cycle effects (see, for example, Solon (1992), Mazumder (2005)).14 However, most
studies deal with father-son linkages, and research on women, and in particular on gender
bias is lacking.
Research on intergenerational economic mobility in developing countries remains relatively
neglected. This partly reflects the data constraints. Good quality income data for long
enough time periods to calculate permanent income remain rare. As a result, the focus of
the research on developing countries has been on intergenerational educational persistence,
with a relatively small strand devoted to occupational persistence.15 For an excellent survey
of this literature, see Iversen et al. (2019). For cross-country evidence, please see Hertz et al.
(2008) and Neidhofer et al. (2018). The recent studies on India include Azam and Bhatt
(2015), Azam (2016), Emran and Shilpi (2015), Asher et al. (2018). For recent analysis of
14The recent papers on developed countries include Chetty et al. (2014), Card et al. (2018), Chetty et al.
(2020), Black et al. (2020).
15For a discussion on the methodological challenges and data constraints in research on intergenerational
mobility in developing countries, see Emran and Shilpi (2019).
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intergenerational educational mobility in Africa, see Azomahou and Yitbarek (2021), and
Alesina et al. (2019). While Azomahou and Yitbarek (2021) and Alesina et al. (2019) provide
estimates of intergenerational educational mobility for both men and women, their focus is not
on the sources and implications of gender bias.16 We are not aware of any study that analyzes
gender bias in intergenerational mobility using estimating equations derived from an explicit
theoretical model. The close connection between theory and empirical work in this paper sets
it apart from the existing literature on intergenerational educational mobility in developing
countries. Among the studies on intergenerational occupational persistence, see Azam (2015)
on India, Emran and Shilpi (2011) on Nepal and Vietnam. For evidence on intergenerational
persistence in health in developing countries, see Bhalotra and Rawlings (2013).
(3) Sons vs. Daughters: A Model of Gender Bias in Intergenerational Educa-
tional Mobility
The economy consists of households with a parent and a child (son denoted by s, and
daughter denoted by d). The parent of child i has schooling Hpi . Given the education level,







Since our empirical work focuses on father’s education because of data constraints, we
couch the discussion in terms of father as the parent. The income determination equation
assumes that fathers with zero years of schooling earn Y p
0
> 0, and the return to education
is Rp in the parental generation. The assumption that Y p
0
> 0 reflects our empirical context
where 40-50 percent of fathers have zero years of schooling, but most of them report positive
income.17
The father allocates his income Y pi to own consumption C
p
i and investment in the child’s





i + Ii. (2)
16Alesina et al. (2019) provide estimates of absolute mobility, but relative mobility is not studied. Azomahou
and Yitbarek (2021) focus on relative mobility, but do not study absolute mobility. We study both relative
and absolute mobility.
17In our main estimation sample of 18-35 years aged children, 39.83 percent fathers have zero schooling.
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The budget constraint assumes that there is no credit market where the father can borrow
to finance children’s education. This is a plausible assumption in the context of developing
countries where the student loan market (public or private) is underdeveloped or nonexistent.
We assume that the education production function exhibits two features: (i) diminish-

































≥ 0.18 The last inequalities are weak to allow for the possibility that, over the
relevant range, the education production function is approximately linear. The direct effect
of parental education captures nonfinancial aspects including home tutoring and role model
effects. The intercept term (δ0) captures the common family and school factors that affect a
child’s education irrespective of gender and thus is not indexed by j. The slope parameters

















where Lj denotes the learning environment faced by a child of gender j in the school, and
φ is the ability of a child.19 The specifications in (4) imply that higher ability and better
learning environment increase the marginal returns to parental investment by both increasing
the linear coefficient δj
1
and by reducing the degree of diminishing returns through a lower δj
2
.
The girls may face a relatively unfavorable learning environment (Ld < Ls) when going to the
same school as the boys because of factors such as a lack of female teachers as role models,
and the unavailability of appropriate infrastructure such as separate restrooms for girls. They
may also face harassment on the road to school and in school by boys.
It is important to appreciate the distinction between the true ability of a child φ and a
parent’s estimate of a child’s ability denoted as φ̃j. Investment choices of parents (Ii) are
18Equation (3) is different from the Becker et al. (2018) specification in that it does not admit possible
convexity in the mobility CEF arising from complementarity between parental education and financial invest-
ment. The evidence below shows that the mobility CEF in India is concave, consistent with the assumption
of no significant complementarity.
19The assumption that ability is not indexed by gender reflects substantial evidence that cognitive ability
does not depend on the gender of a child in a systematic manner, ceteris paribus (Hyde et al. (2008)).
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determined by the estimated ability φ̃j, and given an investment level, the actual educational
attainment (Hcj) is determined by the true ability of a child φ. In societies where son prefer-
ence is strong, it is likely that the parents would overestimate a son’s ability and underestimate
a daughter’s ability, implying that φ̃s > φ > φ̃d.20 The schooling production function used by
the father (denoted as H̃c) for a given level of financial investment can be written as:
H̃
cj





























j. In contrast to the true production
function (3), ability is gender specific in equation (5), with j = s, d.







The returns to education Rcj are gender specific. There is substantial evidence that returns
to education in the labor market may be higher for women. In an extensive cross-country
study, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018) find that, in about 66 percent cases, returns to
education in the labor market are higher for women. Higher returns for girls are also observed
in India during the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Bargain et al. (2009)). Pitt et al.
(2012) suggest that the higher returns to education for girls reflect two factors: (i) structural
change in favor of skill-intensive occupations, and (ii) women’s comparative advantage in
skill-intensive occupations as opposed to brawn-intensive occupations. However, the evidence
also consistently shows that there is a substantial gender wage-gap against women due to the




in most of the cases. It is well-known that returns to education play
a prominent role in intergenerational educational persistence (Solon (2004)). As we will see
below, in contrast, the intercept Y cj
0
matters much less.
For the analysis of the mechanisms underlying intergenerational persistence in schooling,
we assume that the parents are aware of the fact that the labor market returns are higher for
girls, even though they might hold incorrect expectations about the levels of the returns.21
20If gender bias in the household is strong enough to systematically discriminate against girls in food and
medical care, especially in the early years of a child’s life, girls may end up with lower academic ability. In
this case, the inequality above will also reflect the actual differences in cognitive ability generated by gender
bias.
21In a widely-cited study, Jensen (2010) shows that parents in the Dominican Republic underestimate the
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We also show that the empirical evidence from the mobility and investment equations leads to
highly implausible conclusions if we assume that the parents are not aware of higher returns
to education for girls, and incorrectly believe the returns to be lower for them. To the best of
our knowledge, there are no studies on eliciting parental belief about returns to education for
sons vs. daughters in India.22
(3.1) Optimal Educational Investment
Following Becker et al. (2015), the consumption sub-utility of the parent is a concave
quadratic function:










i = U (C
p







+ λ [Y pi − C
p
i − Ii] (8)
where σj is the degree of parental altruism, and “pure son preference” implies that σs > σd,







The first order conditions are (ignoring the i subscript for notational simplicity):
α1 − 2α2C










− λ = 0
(9)
Using the first order conditions and equations (1) and (2) above, we solve for the optimal






returns to education, but he does not analyze possible gender differences in parental belief. In a related study
in the context of India, Jensen (2012) finds that women’s education responds positively to labor market op-
portunities, suggesting labor market returns are important for parental decisions regarding women’s education
in India.
22Some readers might argue that casual observations suggest that many parents believe it is not “worth”
investing in a girl’s education. However, parents’ beliefs primarily reflect the gender wage gap against girls
(reflecting a lower intercept for girls) which is likely to be salient in their information set. To elicit their belief
about Mincerian returns (wage gradient) one needs a well-designed study.
23Pure son preference reflects cultural norms in a patrilineal and patrilocal society. The parents may also

































It is important to note some of the implications of equations (11) and (12) which are
not well appreciated in the current literature on intergenerational educational mobility. The





= 0) (see the next sub-section).24 In this case, gender bias in the form of pure
son preference (i.e., σd < σs), lower returns to education for girls (i.e., Rcd < Rcs), a lower
estimate of academic ability of girls (i.e., φ̃d < φ̃s), and unfavorable school environment faced








= Rp. This suggests
that we should be careful in interpreting the estimates of the investment equation (10) above.
Without the benefit of the theory, many researchers would interpret the finding that the data




as evidence against gender bias in educational expenditure.
(3.2) Intergenerational Persistence in Education
The optimal education of a child can be written as follows:
Hcj
∗















where I∗ is given by equation (10) above.
Since optimal investment I∗ is a linear function of parental educationHp, children’s optimal
education Hcj
∗
is a quadratic function of parental education Hp even when δj
4
= 0. The















= 0 implies that δ̃j
2
= 0. It seems highly implausible that parents would mistakenly think the production
function to be quadratic when it is linear. One can argue that when the true production function is quadratic,
parents might use a rule-of-thumb linear production function for their optimization because of bounded ra-
tionality and imperfect information. However, a testable implication of a linear rule of thumb production






















































The theoretical analysis above clarifies the assumptions implicit in the linear CEF used
almost universally in the existing empirical literature on intergenerational educational mo-
bility. A linear intergenerational persistence equation implies that ψj
2






= 0, implying constant returns in the education production function. In the linear
model, parental bias against girls in financial investment does not affect relative mobility, as
measured by the slope parameter ψj
1
. In this case, relative mobility can be affected by parental
bias only through nonfinancial inputs as captured by the parameter δj
3
or unfavorable school













The effects of parental bias in financial investment are captured by the intercept of the linear
CEF (i.e., ψ̂j
0
) alone, and affects absolute mobility. In a linear model, the mobility intercept
is ψj
0




















. The mobility intercept thus









(3.3) Sources of Gender Bias: Sorting Out the Mechanisms
A comparison of the two estimating equations (investment equation (10) and mobility
equation (14)) above shows that the parental gender bias in ability estimate and pure son
preference are reflected in the parameters of the investment equation, while the estimated
mobility parameters are especially useful in understanding the role played by the direct (non-
financial) impact of parents’ education on children’s schooling.25
From the investment equation (10) and mobility equation (14), we estimate 5 parameters
for each gender, and the estimated parameters provide us 5 binary relations for girls vs.
boys. These binary relations impose restrictions on the potential explanations, and help
sort out the existence and mechanisms of gender bias.26 We combine the evidence from a
25The existing work on intergenerational educational mobility we are aware of exclusively focuses on the
mobility equation and does not estimate the investment equation.
26It is important to appreciate that the inference about the mechanisms refer to the whole population of
interest, rather than a subset.
11
substantial literature on the gender differences in returns to education with the estimates of
the investment and mobility parameters for sons vs. daughters. Once we have the estimates
of the parameters of the investment equation, the linear and quadratic coefficients of the
mobility equation help us understand gender bias in parental nonfinancial inputs. Although
the potential importance of parental nonfinancial inputs in intergenerational mobility has been
emphasized in the literature including by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), we are not aware
of any analysis of intergenerational educational mobility in developing countries that provides
evidence on this issue.27
However, it is also important to recognize a limitation of the approach developed in this
paper: in some cases, evidence on the binary relations and returns to education may not be
able to discriminate between alternative hypotheses about a particular source of gender bias.
Thus, we cannot say whether this specific mechanism is operative in the data, and in such
cases, we call the evidence “uninformative” or “not informative”.
(4) Measures of Relative and Absolute Mobility
In a linear model of mobility (i.e., with ψ2 = 0), the slope parameter ψ1 is known as
intergenerational regression coefficient (IGRC) in the literature. IGRC is the most widely used
measure of relative mobility (Hertz et al. (2008)). When data reject the linear CEF in favor of
a quadratic CEF, we do not have a constant relative mobility measure like IGRC. The marginal
effect of father’s education varies across the distribution, and we call it “intergenerational











where IGMEk stands for intergenerational marginal effect for the children of fathers with H
p
k
years of schooling. In the empirical analysis, we will provide estimates of IGMEk at focal
points of father’s education distribution such as no schooling, primary (5 years), secondary
(10 years), college (15 years), and Masters (17 years).28
As a measure of absolute mobility, we provide estimates of expected years of schooling for
the children conditional on father’s schooling, denoted as EHck when the father has H
p
k years
27Lefgren et al. (2012) provide evidence that father’s financial resources explain only a minority of intergen-
erational income elasticity in Sweden.

















Absolute mobility thus depends on both the slope and the intercept estimates of the inter-
generational persistence equation (14) above. This definition of absolute mobility is similar
to that of Chetty et al. (2014).29
An important subgroup in our analysis consists of the children of the parents with zero
schooling (i.e., Hpk = 0), as the proportion of fathers with no schooling is substantial in our
data. For example, in rural areas, 47 percent of fathers have no schooling (based on the 18-35
age sample). These children come from the most disadvantaged socioeconomic background.
For this subgroup, absolute mobility is defined solely by the intercept term ψ̂j
0
. Thus, the
potential biases in the estimated intercept is of especial interest in our analysis, even though
the focus of the current literature is on the biases in the estimated slope. Recent evidence




(see Emran and Shilpi (2019)); consequently, the estimates based on coresident samples
are likely to overestimate the absolute mobility of the children from the most disadvantaged
background.30 There are also important conceptual implications: ψ̂j
0
does not depend on δ3
and δ4, implying that the absolute mobility of the children of fathers with no education is
unaffected by the nonfinancial influences of fathers such as home tutoring. The fact that
only educated parents can provide nonfinancial inputs such as home tutoring is an important
source of heterogeneity in absolute mobility between the children of educated and uneducated
parents. In contrast, relative mobility of the children of fathers with zero schooling is given by
the parameter ψ̂j
1
which depends on the nonfinancial inputs of parents through δ3. This reflects
the fact that relative mobility captures the marginal effect of one year of more schooling for
a father.
29There is a different concept of absolute mobility adopted by many authors where the focus is on whether
a child attains higher education than his/her parents. This is a weak concept of upward mobility in a context
where a substantial proportion of fathers has zero schooling (47 percent in our rural India sample). In this
case, even one year of schooling would be counted as upward mobility for the children from almost 50 percent
of the households in rural India, even though they are still at the bottom of the schooling distribution in their
own generation.
30Sample truncation at the tails of the distribution rotates a positively sloped regression function clockwise
inflating the intercept estimate while lowering the slope.
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(5) Data
The data for estimating the intergenerational educational mobility come from the second
round of India Human Development Survey (IHDS)-2012. The IHDS is a high quality nation-
ally representative household panel survey of 41554 households with two rounds in 2005 and
2012.31 The survey covers both rural and urban areas. Compared to other data sets commonly
used to study intergenerational mobility in India (e.g., National Sample Survey (NSS), and
National Family Health Survey (NFHS)), IHDS-2012 has three important advantages. First,
it includes a nonresident module to collect information on the children not in the household
at the time of the survey including those who are away attending college. This module also
includes the noresident husbands of the female headed households. Second, it collected infor-
mation on the nonresident father of household head. Third, it includes an “eligible women”
module that collected information on the father of two ever married women of age 15-49,
including household head’s spouse (irrespective of father’s residency status).
To generate matched son-father pairs for our mobility analysis, we implement a two-step
procedure. First, we follow Azam and Bhatt (2015) closely (see the Table 8 in Azam and
Bhatt (2015)) and gather household head’s father’s education information directly from the
household module, irrespective of a father’s residency status at the time of the survey.32 In
the second step (not implemented by Azam and Bhatt (2015)), we include children from the
nonresident module.33 There are 9877 father-son pairs in our urban sample and 17761 in our
rural sample for the 18-35 age group. To generate matched daughter-father pairs, we follow
Azam (2016) closely, and include women from the “eligible women” module (see the Table 1
in Azam (2016)).34 Again, we add the daughters from the nonresident module, unlike Azam
(2016). However, note that our estimation samples differ from that in Azam and Bhatt (2015)
and Azam (2016) in another respect. Unlike Azam and Bhatt (2015) and Azam (2016), our
sample does not include the children from the female headed households where household
31The survey is a collaborative project between University of Maryland and National Council for Applied
Economic Research (NCAER) in India.
32The only difference is that we use wave 2 (2012) while Azam and Bhatt (2015) use wave 1 (2005) of IHDS
panel data. IHDS 2005 cannot be used for our mobility analysis as it does not include the “eligible women”
module discussed above.
33The comparison between our sample using IHDS-2012 to Azam and Bhatt’s sample using IHDS-2005 is
documented in the online appendix Table A1.S.
34Since Azam (2016) also uses IHDS-2012 data, we can compare our sample precisely, as shown in the online
appendix Table A1.D.
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head is a widow, because their father’s education information is not available.35 In our main
estimation sample of 18-35 age group of children, there are 9326 daughter-father pairs in urban
areas, and 17387 in rural areas.36 To check whether the conclusions are driven by the older
children in our sample, we progressively exclude older children from the sample and use 18-30
and 18-28 age ranges for the estimation of the mobility equation. For rural India, we also use
16-35 age group because the average level of education is low. For urban India, we use 20-35
age group to ensure that the conclusions are not affected by censoring of years of schooling
for those children who attend 3-year college. For details, see section (8) below.
For estimation of the investment equation, we take advantage of the first round of the
IHDS survey in 2005 that provides education expenditure data at the child level. Education
expenditure includes school fees, books, uniform, transportation and other materials, and
private tuition for the last year. We report investment estimates for two age groups: 8-28 and
11-28 in 2005. We set 28 years as the upper age cutoff as it corresponds to 35 years in 2012.
However, many children in the age group 18-28 in 2005 have already completed their schooling,
and are not captured in the investment sample. This constitutes part of the motivation to
check the robustness of the mobility results using samples that exclude older children (18-30,
18-28) as noted in the preceding paragraph. To ensure that the conclusions are not driven by
a few outliers, we winsorize and trim the expenditure data at 99.9 percentile. In the 11-28
age group, this affects only 16 observations out of 15285 observations in rural sample, and 10
observations out of 9360 observations in urban sample.
The summary statistics for our main estimation samples are reported in Table 1, the upper
panel for the urban sample and the lower panel for the rural sample. The mean education of
fathers in urban areas is 6.70 years in the sons sub-sample, and 6.51 years in the daughters sub-
sample of the main estimation sample for intergenerational mobility (18-35 year old children
in 2012). The average schooling is 10 years for sons and 9.43 for daughters in urban sample.
In the rural sample, the average education of fathers is much lower; 4.01 years (sons sub-
sample) and 3.87 (daughters sub-sample). The gender gap in average schooling is also much
35We are grateful to Sonalde Desai, principal investigator for the IHDS survey, for clarifying the questionnaire
in this regard which was apparently misinterpreted by Azam and Bhatt (2015) because of confusing wording.
Please see the discussion in online appendix section OA.5.
36If one relies on only the coresident sub-sample, 54 percent of our estimation sample in urban areas and 46
percent in the rural areas would be included. Sample truncation is especially severe for girls: the coresident
sub-sample is only 32 percent of our estimation sample in urban areas and 22 percent in rural.
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more pronounced in the rural areas; 8.31 years (sons) vs. 6.35 years (daughters). The average
educational expenditure in IHDS-2005 is higher for sons and it is true irrespective of geographic
location and for both the estimation samples: 8-28 year old and 11-28 year old.
(6) Gender and Intergenerational Educational Mobility in Urban India:
Evidence and Interpretations
The discussion focuses on the results from the sample of 18-35 year old children (reported
in the main paper) with reference to the estimates from the 18-30, 18-28, and 20-35 age
ranges where necessary. All the regressions (investment and mobility) control for the number
of children in a family. The standard errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit which
is district in the IHDS survey.
(6.1) Estimates of the Mobility Equation
The estimates of intergenerational schooling persistence in urban India are reported in
the upper panel of Table 2. The first two columns contain the evidence from a linear CEF
comparable to the existing literature. The estimate of the slope parameter ψ1 in urban India
for daughters (0.523) is higher than that for sons (0.450), suggesting a higher intergenerational
persistence in schooling (lower relative mobility) for the daughters irrespective of father’s
education (the gender difference is significant at the 1 percent level). The intercept for the
daughters is also lower.
The estimates from a linear CEF are consistent with the common perception of strong
gender bias against girls in India. However, evidence rejects the assumption of linearity; the
estimates of the quadratic coefficient in columns (4) (for sons) and (5) (for daughters) in Table
2 are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The quadratic coefficient is
numerically or statistically not significantly different (at the 10 percent level) across gender.
As a measure of absolute mobility, we report estimated expected years of schooling con-
ditional on a father having 0, 5, 10, 15, and 17 years of schooling in the bottom panel of
Table 2.37 The daughters born to low educated fathers face substantial disadvantage in term
of expected schooling attainment (the EHc
0
estimates are: 5.85 (daughters) vs. 6.92 (sons)),
and the gender difference is significant at the 1 percent level.38 But the gender difference
37We chose 15 years as a focal point (instead of 16 years) because of 3 years Bachelors degree in Indian




estimates refer to the children of fathers with zero years of schooling. The proportion of fathers
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is numerically small and not significant at the 10 percent level when the father has college
education (the EHc
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estimate is 13.48 for daughters and 13.52 for sons).
For relative mobility, the estimated IGMEs39 in the bottom panel of Table 2 show that the
persistence is much stronger for the girls born to fathers with low education (IGME0 estimates
are: 0.65 (daughters) vs. 0.56 (sons)), but the gender difference becomes negligible and
statistically insignificant when the father has college or more education: (IGME15 estimates
are: 0.32 (sons) vs. 0.37 (daughters)).
Evidence on absolute and relative mobility thus favors the idea that the gender differences
in educational mobility of children may primarily be a product of low education of parents.
This also brings into focus the incorrect conclusions from the standard linear mobility CEF
that the daughters face substantially lower relative mobility throughout the parental schooling
distribution. Section (9) below provides a detailed discussion of the misleading conclusions
one might get when linearity is a maintained assumption.
(6.2) Estimates of the Investment Equation
The estimates of the parameters of the investment equation θ0 and θ1 for urban India are
reported in the upper panel of Table 4, using the first round of IHDS (2005) data. The evidence




; the interaction of father’s education with
the daughter dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 3 cases,
and at the 10 percent level in 1 case.40 The estimates of the intercept show a different picture:






For ease of reference, we summarize the binary relations across gender for the estimated
investment and mobility parameters in Table 5. To help a reader keep track of the different
parameters we present a summary of the notation and interpretation of the key parameters
in Table N at the beginning of the online appendix.
with zero schooling in urban India is 26.44 percent in our sample.








40This is consistent with the existing evidence on gender bias against girls in educational expenditure in India
(see Kingdon (2007), Azam and Kingdon (2013)). Note, however, that the existing evidence while suggestive
does not provide estimates of the effects of father’s education on children’s educational expenditure, which is
the focus of the investment equation in intergenerational mobility analysis.
41The magnitude of the coefficient on girl dummy is small compared to the estimated constant in the 11-28
sample. This sample includes only those age cohorts that overlap with our mobility sample.
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(6.3) Sources of Gender Bias in Urban India



























A substantial body of evidence on urban India suggests that the returns to education in the
labor market are higher for daughters, especially at the secondary and higher secondary levels
(see, for example, Duraisamy (2002), Aslam et al. (2010)).42 For a summary of the available
estimates of returns to education in urban India, please see Table A0 in online appendix
section OA.4.43 Given that Rcd > Rcs in urban India, an immediate observation is that it is
not possible to satisfy equation (20) if there are no gender biases, i.e, if φ̃s = φ̃d, Ls = Ld, and









School Environment and Parental Estimate of Ability














, keeping σd = σs. For this, it is useful to look at
the intercept of the investment equation as a function of returns to education (i.e., θ0 (R
c))



























. As discussed in detail in the online appendix OA.1, θ0 (R
c) is a
positively sloped concave function. A higher δ̃1 and/or a lower δ̃2 rotates up the θ0 (R
c) curve





> 0 in Figure F1. An inspection of Figure F1 shows that the returns
to education must be smaller for the upper curve with higher ability estimate and/or better
learning environment. Since the evidence suggests Rcd > Rcs, the upper curve must refer
42There is substantial evidence that educated women, especially married women, withdraw from the labor
market and devote to home production such as child care and home tutoring (Afridi et al. (2018)). This
may partly reflect the fact that there is a significant gender wage gap against women in the labor market
even though the Mincerian returns are higher, reflecting a low intercept for women in the income equation.
Moreover, the expected returns to education for daughters Rcd capture both labor market and non-market
returns (expressed in shadow prices), including the returns in the marriage market, and from home production.
43We focus on the returns to education at secondary (10 years of schooling) and higher secondary (12 years
of schooling) levels, given that the average education in urban India in our data set is 9.93 years for the sons,
and 9.43 years for the daughters.
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to the sons, implying that the parents hold systematically lower estimates of the ability of
daughters and/or the girls face substantial hurdles in school. The evidence thus is consistent
with the joint hypothesis that φ̃s > φ̃d and/or Ls > Ld, and σd = σs.44
For unfavorable school environment, the evidence is in fact much stronger. This can
be seen from the estimates of the intercepts of the investment equation and the mobility




, implying the following (denote



























in inequality (21) are the parameters of true production function
not affected by parental bias in estimating a girl’s ability. Any gender differences in these
parameters must be due to differences in learning environment in school as captured by Lj. It
is easy to check that bias in the school against girls, i.e., Ld < Ls, is necessary and sufficient






















































> 0 in this case and inequality (21) is
satisfied. The evidence thus is strong that the girls in urban India face unfavorable learning
environment in school.
Pure Son Preference
The evidence in urban India is, however, not informative about whether the parents exhibit





, are not helpful because, without additional information on the curvatures of the
utility and the education production function, we cannot determine whether a higher value of
σj shifts the θ0 (R
c) curve up or down (please see online appendix section OA.1). As it turns





44As discussed before we assume that the parents are aware of the fact that the returns to education is higher
for girls. If one assumes that the parents incorrectly believe lower returns for daughters, i.e., Rcd < Rcs, then
retracing of the preceding argument implies gender bias against boys: the girls enjoy more favorable school
environment and/or parents estimate the academic ability of daughters to be higher. These conclusions are
inconsistent with the extensive evidence on gender bias against girls discussed earlier. In a patrilineal society,















does not impose any restrictions on
the binary relation between σd and σs.45
Parental Direct (nonfinancial) Inputs






in the education production function, and the evidence is informative for both. The focus










the gender of a child.
As noted in section (3.3), the parameters of the investment equation are not affected by
direct (nonfinancial) inputs of parents, but parameters of the mobility equation are. We first
analyze whether the evidence is informative about possible gender differences in δj
3
which





































































> 0. It is




for inequality (22) to hold. The evidence thus suggests that
parental direct inputs are important for relative mobility of the daughters born into the most
disadvantaged family background.
To understand gender differences in the degree of diminishing returns to the direct parental
inputs (δj
4



























, which implies that
45We emphasize that this does not imply an absence of son preference in urban India, just that we cannot
say anything about it.
46In urban India, 26.44 percent of children have fathers with zero schooling in our sample.




are not affected by parental biases. The






equation (23) cannot be satisfied without some form of gender bias that works through δ2
and/or δ4.
48 However, unfavorable school environment for girls working through δ2 does not
help satisfy equation (23). This follows from the observation that, starting at no gender











, while a better learning environment for the boys




)2.49 The upshot of the above discussion is that, to satisfy equation




, implying that the diminishing returns to the
direct impact of father’s education are stronger for daughters. As noted earlier, the evidence




which suggests that girls face stronger diminishing returns to
financial investment because of the constraints in school. The daughters in urban India thus
seem to face stronger diminishing returns at double margins: both at home and school.


















is higher for the daughters, assuming that father’s education is not too
high. Given the evidence of bias in educational expenditure, the higher nonfinancial impacts of
educated parents on girls seem to play an important role in gender parity in absolute mobility
in the college-educated households in urban India.
(7) Gender and Intergenerational Educational Mobility in Rural India:
Evidence and Interpretations
(7.1) Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility
The estimates of intergenerational persistence in schooling in rural India for the 18-35 age
cohorts are reported in Table 3. The estimates from the linear CEF are similar to those in
urban India; the IGRC (i.e., ψ̂j
1
) estimate is larger for the daughters implying a lower relative
mobility, while the intercept is smaller.
Evidence in columns (4) and (5) in Table 3 rejects the null hypothesis of a linear CEF at
the 1 percent level in favor of a concave CEF, for both sons and daughters. Similar to the
urban case, gender equality is rejected at the 1 percent level for the intercepts and the linear














































is 57 percent higher in rural India. Although the gender difference is significant only at the
48Again, it is important to recognize that δ2 and δ4 are the parameters of the “true” production function
not affected by parental bias.






10 percent level in Table 3, it is significant at the 5 percent level for the 18-30 age range (see
Table A3 in online appendix) and at the 1 percent level for the 16-35 age range (see Table A5
in online appendix) and 18-28 years age range (available from the authors). Taken together,



















The estimates of intergenerational mobility in the bottom panel of Table 3 show that the
girls face substantially lower mobility, both in absolute and relative measures, when they are
born to low educated parents (primary schooling or lower). The girls face lower absolute
mobility across the distribution of father’s education, and the gender difference is significant
at the 1 percent level across the board. For the fathers with no schooling, the gender gap in
absolute mobility of the children is large in villages: 2.19 years of less expected schooling for
girls (1.07 years in urban India). Even when her father is college educated, a girl growing up
in rural India expects 1.4 year less schooling on average. This is in contrast to the evidence
on urban India where the gender gap in absolute mobility becomes small and statistically
insignificant for the children of college educated fathers.
The estimates show substantially lower relative mobility for the daughters born into rural
households with low educated fathers (compare the IGME0 estimates: of 0.52 (sons) and
0.65 (daughters)).50 The gender difference in IGME, however, becomes negligible for the
households with fathers having 10 years or more schooling. Again, the conclusion from the
standard linear model that the daughters face lower relative mobility across the distribution
turns out to be incorrect.
(7.2) Estimates of the Investment Equation
The estimates of the parameters of the investment equation in lower panel of Table 4 show
that the results are different from those in urban India. The daughter dummy is negative





This is consistent with the existing literature in the context of rural India (Azam and Kingdon





the interaction of daughter dummy with father’s schooling is not statistically significant in
any of the four columns in the lower panel of Table 4 at the 5 percent level.52
50Recall that about 47 percent of fathers in rural India in our data have zero schooling.
51Azam and Kingdon (2013) show that the gender bias against girls in education expenditure is larger in
rural areas in India.
52Only 1 out of 4 estimates is significant at the 10 percent level. The magnitudes of the gender difference in
the estimated slopes are also small compared to the estimates for urban India in the upper panel of Table 4.
22
Again, for easy reference, the binary relations across sons and daughters in the estimated
parameters of both the investment and mobility equations are summarized in Table 5. Table N
at the beginning of the online appendix will be useful to keep track of the different parameters
in the discussion on mechanisms below.
(7.3) Sources of Gender Bias in Rural India
School Environment and Parental Estimate of Ability
The evidence reported in Table A0 (see online appendix section OA.4) suggests higher





with Rcd > Rcs. Again, we consider the θ0 (R
c) function for alternative
values of parental estimate of children’s ability and/or school environment. This case is
depicted in Figure F2 where the upper curve refers to higher ability estimate and/or more
favorable learning environment, similar to Figure F1 discussed earlier. However, unlike Figure




, here we impose two horizontal lines




. An inspection of the graph makes it clear that




with Rcd > Rcs if the upper curve in Figure F2 refers to
the daughters. The evidence depicted in Figure F2 is consistent only with the case where the
upper curve refers to sons, suggesting gender bias against girls in the form of lower ability
estimate by parents and/or unfavorable school environment (keeping σd = σs).









, when considered together, is consistent with unfavorable school environment for
girls. But, unlike urban India, they do not help strengthen the conclusions discussed in the








to hold simultaneously, but it is not necessary (in urban India, it is necessary). For details,
please see section OA.2 in online appendix.
Pure Son Preference
The evidence in urban India discussed above did not allow us to make any inferences
regarding whether the parents exhibit pure son preference in the sense of σd < σs. However,
the estimates of the slope of the investment function in rural areas are informative about























σs only if σd < σs, suggesting pure son
preference.
Parental Direct Influence
As before, to see if the evidence is informative about the direct impact of parents in rural
India, we turn to the estimates of the linear and quadratic coefficients of the mobility equation.




































suggests stronger diminishing returns to nonfinancial inputs faced








































, denote the common value by θ̂c
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diminishing returns to financial investment arising from the constraints girls face in school.




. However, unlike urban India, we cannot say whether





. This suggests that the impact of nonfinancial inputs may not be favorable
to girls in villages, unlike the case of urban India. This provides part of the explanation for
the lack of gender parity in absolute mobility in rural areas even when the father is college
educated, in sharp contrast to the parity observed in the urban areas where the marginal
direct impact of father’s education on girls is larger (section (6.3) above).
(8) Robustness Checks: Evidence from Alternative Age Ranges
The empirical results on intergenerational mobility discussed so far are based on the sample
of 18-35 years age cohorts of children in the survey year. One might wonder whether the
conclusions change when we exclude relatively older children from the sample, a relevant
concern given our focus on the younger generation. To check the robustness of the findings,
we estimated the mobility equation (14) for alternative age ranges. The estimates for the
age cohorts 18-30 years are reported in the online appendix; please see Tables A2 (urban),
A3 (rural) in section OA.6.53 In the context of urban areas with higher average education,
a concern is that a minimum age of 18 years might cause censoring of years of schooling
53The estimates for 18-28 age range are also similar and are not reported for the sake of brevity.
24
for a substantial proportion of children who go to college after 12 years of schooling.54 We
report estimates for the 20-35 age sample in the urban areas in the online appendix Table
A4. However, note that the estimation sample with a higher minimum age cut-off will miss
many children with low schooling attainment, especially in rural areas.55 In fact, a 18 year
age cutoff might be too high in rural areas because it misses the children who do not progress
beyond the matriculation public examination administered at the end of 10th grade. We thus
report estimates for 16-35 age cohorts in rural India (Table A5 in online appendix). The main
conclusions remain intact across these different age groups.
(9) Pitfalls of the Maintained Assumption of Linearity
How do the conclusions about gender bias in mobility and the underlying mechanisms
differ if we rely on a linear CEF for estimation, and appeal to the linear model without any
significant diminishing returns to interpret the results? Such a comparison is useful because
most of the studies on intergenerational educational mobility in the current literature we are
aware of adopt the linear functional form, and many researchers would argue that it is an
approximation to an underlying nonlinear relation.56
In urban India, the (incorrect) linear CEF estimates imply that the girls face significantly
lower relative mobility even when the father has college or higher education, in sharp contrast
to the finding in section 6 above that there is no significant gender bias for such highly educated















, but the mobility equation is concave. The linear mobility model again misses the
gender parity in relative mobility in the highly educated households. When interpreted in








together lead to incorrect conclusions about the
mechanisms. For example, the evidence suggests no pure son preference in a linear model while
the correct conclusion from the concave mobility model is that there is pure son preference in
54In our 18-35 age sample, 20 percent children have college or more education in urban areas, but only 7
percent in rural areas.
55In our data, 59 percent rural children in 18-19 year age group did not progress beyond 10 years of schooling,
and the corresponding estimate for urban areas is 41 percent. These children are excluded when the minimum
age is raised to 20.
56Following Chetty et al. (2014), some recent papers use a linear CEF for ranks rather than years of
schooling. The rank-rank linear model can be consistent with an underlying nonlinear model in terms of years
of schooling.
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rural India (section 7 above). For details, please see online appendix section OA.3.
(10) The Implications of Sex Selection and Unwanted Girls
How does sex selective abortion affect the estimates of intergenerational educational mo-
bility? An important insight here is that prevalence of sex selective abortion in fact implies
that the degree of gender bias we observe in the data is lower compared to a benchmark
without any such sex selection. When the parents do not have access to ultrasonography
technology to know the sex of a foetus, they are likely to have unwanted girls. We expect
parental bias against girls in educational choices to be especially strong for such unwanted
girls. The availability of ultrasonography (especially in private clinics) is likely to be higher in
urban areas. Since the average income level is also higher in the urban areas, more households
can afford ultrasonography. Evidence from the first round of IHDS data (2005) shows that
19.97 percent of parents in rural areas had at least one ultrasonography during the two most
recent pregnancies, while the corresponding estimate for the urban India is 41.68 percent. 8.79
percent of the medical facilities in the rural sample had ultrasound equipment that is in good
condition, and 19.12 percent in the urban sample.
When ultrasonography is more accessible and affordable, the surviving girls are likely to
be born to parents with little or no bias against girls. If this channel is important in our
data, we should expect gender differences in intergenerational persistence in urban areas to be
smaller in magnitude even though many people believe that gender bias is stronger because
sex ratio is more skewed. A comparison of the estimates in Tables 2 and 3 in fact shows that
the gender differences in the estimated coefficients of the mobility CEF are much smaller in
magnitude in urban India. For example, the gender difference in the intercept is 1.61 in urban
areas (see Table 2) and 2.62 in rural areas (see Table 3), and the rural-urban estimates are
significantly different at the 5 percent level. This suggests that part of the explanation for
the gender equality observed in urban households with college educated fathers is the fact
that the higher educated (and thus higher income) urban households are less likely to have
unwanted girls.
A related and perhaps more important question is what would be the gender gap in
intergenerational educational mobility in India if the parents had no gender preference for a
new born, and thus there were no unwanted girls; in other words, if the gender of a child was
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effectively random.57 Anukriti et al. (2020) report evidence that the gender of the first child
in India can be treated as quasi random. The evidence from the first child sample (18-35 age
range) are reported in Table 6 (for the 18-30 age range estimates, see online appendix section
OA.7).58 The gender differences in both rural and urban India are less pronounced in the first
child sample when compared to the full sample estimates reported earlier in Tables 2 and 3.
For example, the gender difference in the linear coefficients observed for urban India in the
full sample is no longer statistically significant at the 10 percent level when we use the first
child sample.59
(11) Patrilineal vs. Matrilineal States in India: The Importance of Patrilineal
and Patrilocal Hindu Kinship System
The final exercise we report follows the analysis of Jayachandran and Pande (2017). It
takes advantage of the observation that bias against girls is likely to be much lower in matri-
lineal states. The intergenerational mobility estimates for 18-35 age cohorts in patrilineal and
matrilineal states are reported in Tables 7 (urban) and 8 (rural) (18-30 age cohort results are
in the online appendix section OA.8). While the pattern of the estimates in patrilineal sample
is consistent with the conclusions discussed earlier in the paper, the results on matrilineal
states are strikingly different: gender differences are not significant at the 10 percent level for
any of the coefficients in the matrilineal sample, and this is true in both rural and urban ar-
eas. Using the first round IHDS (2005) data, we find that the matrilineal states provide better
learning environment for girls in school: the share of women teachers in the school and the
probability of having a separate restroom for girls are significantly higher in the matrilineal
states. The share of female teachers is 54 percent in matrilineal states compared to 46 percent
in patrilineal states, and the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. The evidence
on toilets is more striking: 66 percent of schools have separate toilets for girls in matrilineal
states compared to 53 percent in patrilineal states, again the difference is significant at the
1 percent level. This suggests that patrilineal and patrilocal Hindu kinship system plays an
important role in the gender bias in intergenerational educational mobility observed at the
57It is important to appreciate that we can also have no unwanted girls in a very different case: when sex
selection technology is available at no cost to all parents so that all the unwanted girls are aborted.
58In the IHDS survey, it is not possible to determine the birth order of the household head and spouse. We
treat them as the oldest child for the analysis.








This paper provides a theory-based empirical analysis of the sources and implications of
gender bias against girls for intergenerational educational mobility in India. We develop an
extension of the Becker-Tomes model where parents self-finance children’s schooling because
of credit market imperfections, and girls may face bias in the family, school, and labor market.
The model yields a linear conditional expectation function (CEF) under the assumption of
constant returns in education production function but delivers sharp predictions: parental bias
against girls in financial investment arising from pure son preference and/or a biased estimate
of a girls ability is irrelevant for relative mobility. The effects of parental bias are captured by
the intercepts of the investment and mobility equations, which are usually not the focus in the
existing literature on intergenerational mobility relying on a linear estimating equation. When
the education production function exhibits diminishing returns to financial investment, the
mobility CEF is concave. With a concave CEF, parental gender bias in financial investment
affects both relative and absolute mobility.
Using data free of truncation owing to coresidency, we test the above ideas in rural and
urban India. Evidence rejects the linear model: the mobility CEF is concave for both sons and
daughters in rural and urban India. The daughters of uneducated fathers face lower relative
and absolute mobility. There is no significant gender gap in absolute mobility in the educated
households in urban areas, but the gap remains substantial in rural areas. Differences in
the incidence of unwanted girls and direct (nonfinancial) impact of father’s education provide
a plausible explanation for the rural-urban differences in gender gap in absolute mobility
in the educated households. The theoretical insights when combined with the estimates of
the parameters of investment and mobility equations help us pin down some of the sources of
observed gender bias. School environment is unfavorable to girls in both rural and urban India.
There is evidence of pure son preference in rural India, but the evidence is not informative
in urban India. The widely used linear model yields misleading conclusions such as no pure
son preference in rural India, and misses gender parity in relative mobility for the children of
college educated fathers. We find that there are no statistically significant gender differences
in the estimated parameters of the mobility equation in the matrilineal states, while gender
gaps in patrilineal states are significant. This suggests that patrilineal and patrilocal Hindu
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kinship system plays a major role in the observed gender bias in intergenerational educational
mobility at the national level. Evidence from the first child sample suggests that part of
the gender bias is due to the unwanted girls, especially in the rural areas. The theory and
empirical approach developed in this paper may be of wider interest as they are applicable to
other developing countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Full Sons Daughters 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Urban India 
IHDS 2012 (18-35 age) N=19203 N=9877 N=9326 
Father's Sch. 6.60 5.08 6.70 5.00 6.51 5.15 
Children's Sch. 9.77 4.51 10.09 4.20 9.43 4.80 
IHDS 2005 (11-28 age) N=9360 N=4964 N=4396 
Father's Sch. 8.86 4.59 8.82 4.61 8.90 4.57 
Educ. Exp. (Winsor) 4519.07 6177.10 4822.22 6615.88 4176.75 5621.89 
 N=9350 N=4959 N=4391 
Educ. Exp. (Trim) 4454.38 5854.96 4761.54 6337.05 4107.49 5236.73 
IHDS 2005 (8-28 age) N=12817 N=6785 N=6032 
Father's Sch. 8.63 4.67 8.58 4.69 8.67 4.66 
Educ. Exp. (Winsor) 3998.07 5593.53 4283.93 5989.68 3676.51 5092.73 
 N=12803 N=6777 N=6026 
Educ. Exp. (Trim) 3936.83 5280.94 4218.16 5678.84 3620.43 4774.87 
 Rural India 
IHDS 2012 (18-35 age) N=35148 N=17761 N=17387 
Father's Sch. 3.94 4.45 4.01 4.39 3.87 4.51 
Children's Sch. 7.34 4.75 8.31 4.39 6.35 4.89 
IHDS 2005 (11-28 age) N=15285 N=8595 N=6690 
Father's Sch. 5.76 4.59 5.58 4.62 5.99 4.53 
Educ. Exp. (Winsor) 2006.78 3593.54 2163.89 3960.94 1804.93 3045.83 
 N=15269 N=8584 N=6685 
Educ. Exp. (Trim) 1951.25 3159.29 2096.18 3482.35 1765.14 2676.88 
IHDS 2005 (8-28 age) N=22849 N=12632 N=10217 
Father's Sch. 5.62 4.58 5.48 4.61 5.78 4.55 
Educ. Exp. (Winsor) 1623.89 3020.55 1766.77 3331.76 1447.23 2573.70 
 N=22826 N=12615 N=10211 
Educ. Exp. (Trim) 1577.16 2638.84 1704.46 2868.96 1419.88 2313.77 
Notes: IHDS stands for Indian Human Development Survey. Education expenditure data are at the child level 
including school fees, books, uniform, transportation and other materials, and private tuition. Education 




Table 2: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban India 
 LINEAR CEF  QUADRATIC CEF 
        
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 
D – S   Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S ?̂?1 0.450 0.523 0.073  0.559 0.649 0.089 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) ?̂?2     -0.008 -0.009 -0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 7.741 6.124 -1.618  7.585 5.970 -1.614 
 (0.146) (0.154) (0.158)  (0.155) (0.158) (0.167) 
N 9877 9326 19203  9877 9326 19203 
        
 Estimates of Mobility from the Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility  Relative Mobility 
 S D D – S  S D D – S 𝐸𝐻0𝑐 6.920 5.853 -1.067 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸0𝑐 0.559 0.649 0.090 
 (0.126) (0.121) (0.122)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) 𝐸𝐻5𝑐 9.518 8.863 -0.655 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸5𝑐 0.480 0.555 0.075 
 (0.073) (0.085) (0.080)  (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 𝐸𝐻10𝑐  11.718 11.407 -0.311 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸10𝑐  0.400 0.462 0.062 
 (0.060) (0.071) (0.074)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 𝐸𝐻15𝑐  13.522 13.484 -0.038 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸15𝑐  0.321 0.369 0.048 
 (0.076) (0.087) (0.102)  (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) 𝐸𝐻17𝑐  14.133 14.184 0.051 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸17𝑐  0.289 0.331 0.042 
 (0.124) (0.136) (0.162)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.041) 
Notes: (1) The data are from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-35. The dependent variable in the 
regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled for in each 
regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 
of observations. (3) 𝐸𝐻𝑘𝑐  is expected schooling when the father of child c has k years of schooling, and 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑘𝑐 
is the Intergenerational Marginal Effect (IGME) when the father of child c has k years of schooling.  k=0, 5, 





Table 3: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural India 
 LINEAR CEF  QUADRATIC CEF 
        
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 
D – S  Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S ?̂?1 0.447 0.521 0.074  0.523 0.648 0.125 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) ?̂?2     -0.007 -0.011 -0.005* 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 6.548 3.955 -2.593  6.484 3.868 -2.616 
 (0.106) (0.113) (0.118)  (0.109) (0.112) (0.121) 
N 17761 17387 35148  17761 17387 35148 
        
 Estimates of Mobility from the Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility  Relative Mobility 
 S D D – S  S D D – S 𝐸𝐻0𝑐 6.451 4.262 -2.189 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸0𝑐 0.523 0.648 0.125 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.077)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) 𝐸𝐻5𝑐 8.896 7.215 -1.681 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸5𝑐 0.455 0.534 0.079 
 (0.060) (0.085) (0.080)  (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) 𝐸𝐻10𝑐  11.003 9.598 -1.405 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸10𝑐  0.388 0.420 0.032 
 (0.054) (0.087) (0.082)  (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) 𝐸𝐻15𝑐  12.772 11.412 -1.360 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸15𝑐  0.320 0.306 -0.014 
 (0.110) (0.160) (0.179)  (0.029) (0.037) (0.044) 𝐸𝐻17𝑐  13.384 11.978 -1.406 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸17𝑐  0.293 0.260 -0.033 
 (0.169) (0.232) (0.266)  (0.036) (0.045) (0.053) 
Notes: (1) The data come from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-35. The dependent variable in the 
regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled for in each 
regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 
of observations. (3) 𝐸𝐻𝑘𝑐  is expected schooling when the father of child c has k years of schooling, and 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑘𝑐 
is the Intergenerational Marginal Effect (IGME) when the father has k years of schooling.  k=0, 5, 10, 15, 17. 





Table 4: Father's Education and Investment on Children’s Education in India 
 Urban India 
 11-28 Years Children 8-28 Years Children 
 Winsorized  Trimmed  Winsorized Trimmed 
Father's Sch. 367.283 358.137 350.967 340.811 
 (24.588) (23.839) (19.815) (18.952) 
Father's Sch. * 
Daughter Dummy 
-54.251 -55.506 -47.108 -45.476 
 (27.887) (25.772) (21.175) (19.284) 
Daughter Dummy -30.029 -32.967 -104.807 -115.510 
 (199.178) (188.131) (146.257) (137.216) 
Intercept -877.520 -841.611 3148.633 3072.146 
 (86.050) (80.543) (239.654) (224.719) 
No. Observations 9360 9350 12817 12803 
 Rural India 
Father's Sch. 174.056 154.131 149.402 131.150 
 (15.440) (12.635) (11.150) (8.732) 
Father's Sch. * 
Daughter Dummy 
-24.947 -13.917 -20.855 -9.583 
 (16.152) (13.093) (10.807) (8.340) 
Daughter Dummy -182.634 -225.084 -183.298 -217.123 
 (64.533) (58.570) (43.546) (39.522) 
Intercept -394.579 -349.332 1801.340 1728.625 
 (34.429) (27.823) (84.267) (75.720) 
No. Observations 15285 15269 22849 22826 
Notes: (1) The data used come from IHDS 2005 round. (2) The dependent variable is educational expenditure 
at the child level which includes school tuition and fees, supplementary fees (such as books, uniforms, 
transportation, and others), and private tutor fees. The dependent variable is winsarized and trimmed at 99.9 
percentile. (3) Number of children in a household is controlled for in each regression.  (4) Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at primary sampling unit level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the Binary Relations across Gender for Mobility and Investment 
Equation Estimates 
  Urban India Rural India 
Mobility 
Equation 
?̂?0 ?̂?0𝑑 < ?̂?0𝑠 ?̂?0𝑑 < ?̂?0𝑠 ?̂?1 ?̂?1𝑑 > ?̂?1𝑠 ?̂?1𝑑 > ?̂?1𝑠 
?̂?2 ?̂?2𝑑 , ?̂?2𝑠 < 0 ?̂?2𝑑 = ?̂?2𝑠  ?̂?2𝑑 , ?̂?2𝑠 < 0 |?̂?2𝑑| > |?̂?2𝑠| 
Investment 
Equation 






Table 6: Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in India  
from the First-Born Child Sample 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 





D – S Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S 
 Urban India 
  ?̂?1 0.474 0.537 0.063 0.576 0.627 0.052 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.031) (0.030) (0.038) ?̂?2    -0.007 -0.007 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 7.409 6.017 -1.392 7.271 5.910 -1.360 
 (0.156) (0.157) (0.177) (0.164) (0.161) (0.187) 
N 6288 7627 13915 6288 7627 13915 
 Rural India 
  ?̂?1 0.476 0.523 0.047 0.543 0.627 0.085 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) ?̂?2    -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) ?̂?0 6.231 4.015 -2.183 6.148 3.946 -2.202 
 (0.076) (0.112) (0.124) (0.114) (0.112) (0.126) 
N 12623 15424 28047 12623 15424 28047 
Notes: (1) The data used are from the IHDS 2012 round with the first-born child aged 18-35. The dependent 
variable in the regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled in 
each regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 






Table 7: Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in Urban India 
 Patrilineal States vs. Matrilineal States 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 





D – S Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S 
 Patrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.455 0.529 0.071 0.550 0.629 0.086 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.031) (0.029) (0.035) ?̂?2    -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 7.615 5.887 -1.124 7.489 5.776 -1.123 
 (0.154) (0.163) (0.111) (0.162) (0.167) (0.126) 
N 9058 8488 17546 9058 8488 17546 
 Matrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.335 0.395 0.058 0.434 0.497 0.058 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.032) (0.103) (0.086) (0.110) ?̂?2    -0.006 -0.007 -0.000 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) ?̂?0 9.422 8.380 -0.363 9.160 8.150 -0.318 
 (0.370) (0.292) (0.284) (0.490) (0.362) (0.434) 
N 819 838 1657 819 838 1657 
Notes: (1) The data used are from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-35. The dependent variable in 
the regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled in each 
regression. (2)  The patrilineal and matrilineal classification follows that of Jayachandran and Pande (2017). 
(3) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic coefficient in 






Table 8: Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in Rural India 
 Patrilineal States vs. Matrilineal States 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 





D – S Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S 
 Patrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.443 0.510 0.070 0.512 0.614 0.106 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) ?̂?2    -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 6.498 3.739 -2.271 6.441 3.670 -2.285 
 (0.109) (0.115) (0.073) (0.112) (0.115) (0.078) 
N 16573 16250 32823 16573 16250 32823 
 Matrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.473 0.559 0.086 0.645 0.813 0.168 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.096) (0.089) (0.102) ?̂?2    -0.014 -0.022 -0.008 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) ?̂?0 7.329 6.684 -0.507 7.096 6.423 -0.523 
 (0.418) (0.392) (0.281) (0.444) (0.411) (0.316) 
N 1188 1137 2325 1188 1137 2325 
Notes: (1) The data used are IHDS 2012 with children aged 18-35. The dependent variable in the regression is 
children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled in each regression.  (2) The 
patrilineal and matrilineal classification follows that of Jayachandran and Pande (2017).  (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated 
linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic coefficient in the mobility equation, 











Table N: Summary of the Notations and Interpretations of Key Parameters 
Notation Interpretation 𝑌𝑖𝑝 Parent’s income 𝑌0𝑝 Intercept of parent’s income equation  𝑅𝑝 Return to parent’s education 𝐻𝑖𝑝 Parent’s schooling 𝑌𝑖𝑐𝑗  Gender-specific child’s education 𝑌0𝑐𝑗  Gender-specific intercept of child’s income equation  𝑅𝑐𝑗  Gender-specific return to child’s education 𝐻𝑖𝑐𝑗 Gender-specific child’s education 𝐶𝑖𝑝 Parent’s own consumption 𝐼𝑖  Financial investment in child’s education 𝛿0 Intercept of the true education production function 𝛿1𝑗 Gender-specific productivity of linear financial investment 𝐼 of the true education production function 𝛿2𝑗 Gender-specific productivity of quadratic financial investment 𝐼2 of the true education production function 𝛿3𝑗 Gender-specific productivity of linear non-financial input (direct effect) 𝐻𝑝of the true education production function 𝛿4𝑗 Gender-specific productivity of quadratic non-financial input (direct effect) 𝐻𝑝of the true education production function 𝐿𝑗  Gender-specific school learning environment faced by a child 𝜙 True ability of a child ?̃?𝑗 Gender-specific parental estimation of a child’s ability 𝛿1𝑗 Gender-specific productivity of linear financial investment 𝐼 of the parental estimated education production function 𝛿2𝑗 Gender-specific productivity of quadratic financial investment 𝐼2 of the parental estimated education production function 𝜎𝑗 Gender-specific degree of parental altruism 𝜃0𝑗 Gender-specific intercept of the optimal financial investment equation 𝜃1𝑗 Gender-specific slope of the optimal financial investment equation 𝜓0𝑗  Gender-specific intercept of the intergenerational educational persistence equation 𝜓1𝑗  Gender-specific linear coefficient of the intergenerational educational persistence equation 𝜓2𝑗  Gender-specific quadratic coefficient of the intergenerational educational persistence equation 
 
OA.1: The Intercept of the Investment Equation as a Function of Returns
to Education
Combining information about returns to education with the estimated intercepts of the
investment equation can help understand better whether the parents underestimate a girl’s
ability and whether girls face constraints in school. This can be seen by considering the






















< 0 when Rcd = Rcs = 0. This follows from the observa-
tion that (α1 − 2α2Y
p
0
) is the marginal utility of income for the father with zero schooling
when he spends all his income on own consumption. Under the plausible assumption of
non-satiation, (α1 − 2α2Y
p
0
) > 0. Thus, the intercept of the function θj
0
(Rcj) is negative
and does not depend on the gender of a child.
Next note that, θj
0
(Rcj) is an increasing concave function of returns to schooling, with
































































More importantly, if θj
0





is higher when the parents have higher esti-

















), are not un-
ambiguous without additional restrictions on the curvature of the consumption sub-utility
function (α2). The condition that θ
j
0
> 0 is satisfied in all the cases we consider below in
India.
(1) The Effects of higher ability Estimate on the slope of θj
0
(Rcj) function
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> 0 when θj
0
> 0 which is in fact the case for both j = s, d
according to the empirical evidence reported in the text. Thus, a higher estimate of ability
by parents would result in a higher slope of the curve at each point.
Since at Rcj = 0, the value of θj
0
does not depend on the ability of a child, the curve for
a higher ability estimate, ceteris paribus, lies above the curve for a lower ability estimate
at all positive values of returns to schooling for children.
(2) The effects of a higher school quality on the slope of θj
0
(Rcj) function



































(3) The effects of a stronger son preference on the slope of the θj
0
(Rcj) function
The claim that the effects of pure son preference on the slope is not unambiguous follows
3




































OA.2: Proof that unfavorable school environment is sufficient but not Nec-
essary in Rural India (refer to section 7.3 in the main text)





































The LHS of the above inequality is negative when girls face unfavorable school envi-

























I∗ > 0. However,
clearly the inequality can be satisfied even when the LHS is positive if ∆ > 0 is large
enough.
OA.3: The Pitfalls of Linearity: Additional Discussion
In section (9) of the manuscript, we provide a brief discussion on the conclusions one
gets when the mobility estimates are based on the standard linear CEF, and the linear
theoretical model without any significant diminishing returns is used for interpretation of
the results. Here we provide additional discussions on the claims in section (8) of the
manuscript.
Note that in a linear model, θs
0
= Rp = θd
0
, and we should not see any difference in the
estimates of the slope of the investment equation across gender. However, the estimates




, in contradiction to the theory. This suggests that the linear
model is inappropriate in this case.
4
In rural India, the evidence is consistent with no son preference when linearity is a
maintained assumption. To see this, assume that there is no son preference i.e., σd = σs,










σs. This inequality is satisfied with σd = σs,











































according to the investment estimates, this last








. If the girls face unfavorable









The upshot of the above discussion is that the evidence from the investment and mo-
bility equations is consistent with the following: (i) no pure son preference, (ii) girls face





OA 4: Table on the Available Estimates of Returns to Education 
and List of the Papers Cited 
Table A0: Returns to Education in India 
 URBAN (U) RURAL (R) 
ALL INDIA  
(R + U) 
 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women Year 
SECONDARY  
Duraisamy (2002) 14.7 32.4 17.9 34.1   1993/94 
Kingdon (1998) 4.9 13.4     1995 
Kanjilal et al. (2017) 74.1 91.9     2011/12 
Bargain et al. (2009)     24 64 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009)     28 64 1993/95 
Bargain et al. (2009)         25 41 2002/04 
HIGHER SECONDARY  
Duraisamy (2002) 10.1 12.9 8.4 11   1993/94 
Kanjilal et al. (2017) 108 123 101.4 124.3   2011/12 
Kingdon (1998) 17.6 20.8      
Bargain et al. (2009)     64 124 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009)     60 136 1993/95 
Bargain et al. (2009)     55 109 2002/04 
                
COLLEGE  
Duraisamy (2002) 13.2 9.3 11.6 10.1   1993/94 
Kanjilal et al. (2017) 150.9 153.6 141 146.9   2011/12 
Kingdon (1998) 18 8.9      
Bargain et al. (2009)     111 174 1987/88 
Bargain et al. (2009)     108 175 1993/95 










Papers Cited on Returns to Education in India
Duraisamy (2002), Bargain et al. (2009), Kingdon (1998), Kanjilal-Bhaduri and Pastore
(2018).
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OA.5: Supplementary Discussions on the India Human Development 
Survey (IHDS) 
OA.5.1 The Education of Household Head’s Father 
The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is unique for intergenerational educational and 
occupational mobility studies in India because it collected information on the parents of the 
household head.  The following two questions are relevant:  
• IHDS 2005 – 1.19 What was the occupation of the household head’s father/husband 
(for most of his life)?  
• IHDS 2005 – 1.20 And how many standards/years of education had he completed? 
These two questions provide information on a household head’s father’s education and 
occupation, irrespective of the head’s father’s co-residence status. Such questions are not 
available in other Indian household surveys such as NSS or NFHS.  
In IHDS 2012, there are similar questions: 
• IHDS 2012 – 1.18 What was the primary occupation of the household head’s father / 
husband’s father (for most of his life)?  
• IHDS 2012 – 1.18c And how many standards/years of education had he completed? 
For male headed households, these two questions (1.20 in IHDS 2005 and 1.18c in IHDS 2012) 
are consistent, which provide unambiguous information about male household head’s father’s 
years of education.  
However, when it comes to female headed households, the interpretation of these two questions 
(1.20 in IHDS 2005 and 1.18c in IHDS 2012) becomes ambiguous. In IHDS 2005, does 
question 1.20 refer to the female household head’s husband’s education, since the question 
includes “/husband”? In IHDS 2012, does question 1.18c refer to the female household head’s 
husband’s father’s education, since the question includes “/husband’s father”? Are these two 
questions essentially measuring different household members’ years of education? Are these 
two questions supposed to measure the same thing, but were phrased differently with typos in 
the questionnaires? Answers to these questions matters and have important implications for 
coresidence bias and intergenerational mobility analysis.  
For example, in the analytic sample of Azam & Bhatt (2015), there are 2425 sons in female 
headed households whose fathers (i.e., husbands of female household heads) were deceased 
and thus years of education are not directly available. On the one hand, if question 1.20 refers 
to years of education of the female head’s husband, this question then provides information on 
education of those 2425 sons’ deceased fathers. On the other hand, if question 1.20 has the 
same meaning as question 1.18c in IHDS 2012, then question 1.20 provides information on 
those 2425 sons’ grandfather’s years of education instead of father’s years of education.  
After communicating with the IHDS team, Dr. Sonalde Desai, one of the Principal Primary 
Investigators, offered clarification and confirmation by replying that “Both questions are the 
same across the two waves as clarified in interviewer training as well as in local language 
translations. In both cases it is head’s father if male and heads’s husband’s father if female.” 




Therefore, the correct interpretations of question 1.20 in IHDS 2005 and question 1.18c in 
IHDS 2012 are: 
• For a male headed household, this question provides information on the male household 
head’s father’s education.  
• For a female headed household, this question provides information on the female 
household head’s husband’s father’s education.  
OA.5.2 The Non-Resident Family Members Module 
There are two types of non-residence in the intergenerational mobility literature (for a 
discussion, please see Emran and Shilpi (2019) cited in the main text). The first type is related 
to the older generation, such as the non-parents of a household head. The second type is related 
to the younger generation, such as the non-resident children of a household head. While the 
education of household head’s father variable provides useful information to deal with the first 
type of non-residence issue, as discussed in section OA.5.1, there are two data issues to be 
solved: (i) the non-resident children of household heads, (ii) the non-resident father of female 
household heads. We tackle these two issues by taking advantage of the non-resident family 
members module, which has been largely ignored in the studies using IHDS data such as Azam 
and Bhatt (2015) and Azam (2016) cited in the main text.  
The non-resident family members module provides information on both demographics and 
education of non-resident family members. In particular, this module includes children 
studying outside the household, and spouse who lives outside the household. Therefore, we are 
able to match non-resident children of a household head with his/her father, and match children 
with his/her non-resident father of female household heads. The only limitation of this module 











Total Num of Individuals 
Surveyed in IHDS 
 215,784 204,568 
Total Num of Men in 20-65 Age 
Group 
 58,194 56,883 
Education Information Missing 
(dropped) 
 325 232 
 
Identification through coresidence 
only 




percentage of male aged 20-65 




Panel A. Total Number of Men 
(20-65 age group) with Education 
Information 
Identification of Father   
 a) Individual is head of household 34,069 31,780 
 
b) Individual who are not 
household heads, however, whose 
father is living in the household 
18,056 18,325 
 
c) Individual is neither head of the 
household, nor his father is living 
in the household (no father 
identification is provided) 
4,029 1,905 
Total number of men (20-65 age 
group) whose father is identified: 
a) + b) + c) 
 56,154 52,010 
New: Non-resident Household 
Member Sample 
Non-resident Father N/A 287 
 Non-resident Son N/A 534 
Percentage of men (20-65 age 
group, panel A) whose fathers are 
identified 
 96.494% 92.097% 
Notes: Column 1-3 are directly obtained from Table 8 in Azam (2015) using IHDS 2005 while column 4 is 









Total Surveyed women in age 20-49 45,319 45,319 
Total Surveyed women in age 20-49, with non-missing 
education information  
45,276 45,276 
Father's Edu from household co-resident 4,416 4,416 
Father's Edu from Women's Module 34,290 34,290 
Total Women whose father's Edu is available 38,706 38,706 
New: Individual is head of household, who is not in 
Eligible Women’s Module N/A 194 
New: Individual is neither head of the household, nor 
his father is living in the household (no father 
identification is provided) 
N/A 335 
New: Non-resident Father N/A 113 
New: Non-resident Daughter N/A 179 
% of surveyed women for whom father's Edu is 
available  
85.49% 86.91% 
Notes: Column 1-2 are directly obtained from Table 1 in Azam (2016) using IHDS 2012 while column 





OA.6:  Intergenerational Mobility Estimates for Alternative Age Ranges 
Table A2: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban India (Age 18-30)  
 LINEAR CEF  QUADRATIC CEF 
        
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 
D – S   Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S ?̂?1 0.422 0.495 0.073  0.524 0.614 0.089 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) ?̂?2     -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 8.246 6.468 -1.779  8.074 6.306 -1.768 
 (0.165) (0.168) (0.184)  (0.180) (0.174) (0.198) 
N 7728 7068 14796  7728 7068 14796 
        
 Estimates of Mobility from the Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility  Relative Mobility 
 S D D – S  S D D – S 𝐸𝐻0𝑐 7.202 6.337 -0.865 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸0𝑐 0.524 0.614 0.090 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) 𝐸𝐻5𝑐 9.641 9.188 -0.453 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸5𝑐 0.451 0.527 0.076 
 (0.078) (0.093) (0.087)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 𝐸𝐻10𝑐  11.713 11.603 -0.110 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸10𝑐  0.378 0.440 0.062 
 (0.065) (0.076) (0.079)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 𝐸𝐻15𝑐  13.419 13.584 0.165 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸15𝑐  0.305 0.353 0.048 
 (0.085) (0.089) (0.107)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) 𝐸𝐻17𝑐  13.999 14.254 0.255 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸17𝑐  0.275 0.318 0.043 
 (0.138) (0.144) (0.172)  (0.036) (0.038) (0.044) 
Notes: (1) The data are from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-30.  The dependent variable in the 
regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled for in each 
regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 
of observations. (3) 𝐸𝐻𝑘𝑐  is expected schooling when the father of child c has k years of schooling, and 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑘𝑐 
is the Intergenerational Marginal Effect (IGME) when the father of child c has k years of schooling.  k=0, 5, 





Table A3: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural India (Age 18-30)  
 LINEAR CEF  QUADRATIC CEF 
        
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 
D – S   Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S ?̂?1 0.421 0.502 0.081  0.486 0.636 0.149 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.032) ?̂?2     -0.006 -0.012 -0.006 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 7.248 4.479 -2.769  7.189 4.379 -2.810 
 (0.115) (0.125) (0.133)  (0.119) (0.125) (0.135) 
N 13724 13308 27032  13724 13308 27032 
        
 Estimates of Mobility from the Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility  Relative Mobility 
 S D D – S  S D D – S 𝐸𝐻0𝑐 6.809 4.796 -2.013 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸0𝑐 0.486 0.636 0.150 
 (0.086) (0.094) (0.087)  (0.024) (0.028) (0.032) 𝐸𝐻5𝑐 9.097 7.677 -1.420 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸5𝑐 0.429 0.517 0.088 
 (0.062) (0.088) (0.083)  (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 𝐸𝐻10𝑐  11.097 9.964 -1.133 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸10𝑐  0.371 0.398 0.027 
 (0.055) (0.087) (0.084)  (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) 𝐸𝐻15𝑐  12.808 11.656 -1.152 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸15𝑐  0.313 0.279 -0.034 
 (0.118) (0.160) (0.181)  (0.031) (0.038) (0.045) 𝐸𝐻17𝑐  13.411 12.166 -1.245 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸17𝑐  0.290 0.231 -0.059 
 (0.179) (0.233) (0.271)  (0.038) (0.046) (0.055) 
Notes: (1) The data come from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-30.  The dependent variable in the 
regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled for in each 
regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 
of observations. (3) 𝐸𝐻𝑘𝑐  is expected schooling when the father of child c has k years of schooling, and 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑘𝑐 
is the Intergenerational Marginal Effect (IGME) when the father has k years of schooling.  k=0, 5, 10, 15, 17. 







Table A4: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Urban India (Age 20-35)  
 LINEAR CEF  QUADRATIC CEF 
        
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 
D – S   Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S ?̂?1 0.475 0.545 0.071  0.567 0.649 0.082 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)  (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) ?̂?2     -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 7.528 5.597 -1.931  7.402 5.475 -1.927 
 (0.156) (0.158) (0.168)  (0.164) (0.163) (0.177) 
N 8553 8185 16738  8553 8185 16738 
        
 Estimates of Mobility from the Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility  Relative Mobility 
 S D D – S  S D D – S 𝐸𝐻0𝑐 6.841 5.711 -1.130 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸0𝑐 0.567 0.649 0.082 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.129)  (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) 𝐸𝐻5𝑐 9.508 8.761 -0.747 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸5𝑐 0.500 0.571 0.071 
 (0.078) (0.092) (0.090)  (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 𝐸𝐻10𝑐  11.839 11.424 -0.415 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸10𝑐  0.433 0.494 0.061 
 (0.065) (0.077) (0.081)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 𝐸𝐻15𝑐  13.834 13.700 -0.134 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸15𝑐  0.365 0.416 0.051 
 (0.086) (0.099) (0.120)  (0.028) (0.031) (0.037) 𝐸𝐻17𝑐  14.538 14.502 -0.036 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸17𝑐  0.339 0.386 0.047 
 (0.138) (0.154) (0.190)  (0.035) (0.038) (0.046) 
Notes: (1) The data are from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 20-35.  The dependent variable in the 
regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled for in each 
regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 
of observations. (3) 𝐸𝐻𝑘𝑐  is expected schooling when the father of child c has k years of schooling, and 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑘𝑐 
is the Intergenerational Marginal Effect (IGME) when the father of child c has k years of schooling.  k=0, 5, 
10, 15, 17. (4) 15 years of schooling refer to college degree, and 17 years to a Master’s degree.  (5) Standard 








Table A5: Intergenerational Persistence in Schooling in Rural India (Age 16-35)  
 LINEAR CEF  QUADRATIC CEF 
        
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 
D – S   Sons (S) Daughters 
(D) 
D – S ?̂?1 0.416 0.502 0.085  0.502 0.655 0.153 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) ?̂?2     -0.008 -0.014 -0.006 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 6.891 4.468 -2.423  6.816 4.356 -2.460 
 (0.098) (0.109) (0.110)  (0.100) (0.108) (0.112) 
N 20229 19637 39866  20229 19637 39866 
        
 Estimates of Mobility from the Quadratic CEF 
 Absolute Mobility  Relative Mobility 
 S D D – S  S D D – S 𝐸𝐻0𝑐 6.551 4.462 -2.089 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸0𝑐 0.502 0.655 0.153 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.073)  (0.022) (0.023) (0.027) 𝐸𝐻5𝑐 8.871 7.393 -1.478 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸5𝑐 0.426 0.518 0.092 
 (0.055) (0.076) (0.071)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 𝐸𝐻10𝑐  10.809 9.640 -1.169 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸10𝑐  0.350 0.381 0.031 
 (0.049) (0.077) (0.071)  (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) 𝐸𝐻15𝑐  12.366 11.204 -1.162 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸15𝑐  0.273 0.244 -0.029 
 (0.099) (0.139) (0.156)  (0.027) (0.033) (0.039) 𝐸𝐻17𝑐  12.883 11.637 -1.246 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸17𝑐  0.243 0.189 -0.054 
 (0.151) (0.201) (0.234)  (0.033) (0.039) (0.047) 
Notes: (1) The data come from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 16-35.  The dependent variable in the 
regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled for in each 
regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 
coefficient in the mobility equation, and ?̂?0 is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number 
of observations. (3) 𝐸𝐻𝑘𝑐  is expected schooling when the father of child c has k years of schooling, and 𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑘𝑐 
is the Intergenerational Marginal Effect (IGME) when the father has k years of schooling.  k=0, 5, 10, 15, 17. 




















Table A6: Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in India  
from the First-Born Child Sample (Age 18-30) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
   
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 




 Urban India  
  ?̂?1 0.442 0.515 0.073 0.545 0.601 0.056 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.037) (0.035) (0.045) ?̂?2    -0.007 -0.006 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) ?̂?0 7.959 6.236 -1.723 7.790 6.126 -1.664 
 (0.184) (0.175) (0.214) (0.199) (0.179) (0.228) 
N 4521 5424 9945 4521 5424 9945 
 Rural India  
  ?̂?1 0.450 0.510 0.060 0.513 0.623 0.110 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.027) (0.030) (0.036) ?̂?2    -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) ?̂?0 6.897 4.529 -2.368 6.846 4.447 -2.399 
 (0.126) (0.124) (0.142) (0.129) (0.125) (0.146) 
N 9063 11375 20438 9063 11375 20438 
Notes: (1) The data used are from the IHDS 2012 round with the first-born child aged 18-30.  The dependent 
variable in the regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled in 
each regression. (2) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic 





OA.8: Mobility Estimates for Matrilineal vs. Patrilineal States in India (18-




Table A7: Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in Urban India 
 Patrilineal States vs. Matrilineal States (Age 18-30) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 









 Patrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.425 0.502 0.070 0.511 0.595 0.088 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.034) (0.040) ?̂?2    -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) ?̂?0 8.159 6.225 -0.895 8.025 6.109 -0.903 
 (0.175) (0.179) (0.127) (0.188) (0.184) (0.147) 
N 7082 6469 13551 7082 6469 13551 
 Matrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.341 0.346 0.006 0.511 0.487 -0.030 
 (0.044) (0.027) (0.038) (0.122) (0.094) (0.135) ?̂?2    -0.011 -0.010 0.002 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) ?̂?0 9.312 8.997 0.147 8.798 8.661 0.311 
 (0.434) (0.314) (0.363) (0.608) (0.399) (0.567) 
N 646 599 1245 646 599 1245 
Notes: (1) The data used are from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-30.   The dependent variable in 
the regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled in each 
regression. (2)  The patrilineal and matrilineal classification follows that of Jayachandran and Pande (2017). 
(3) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic coefficient in 






Table A8: Estimates of Intergenerational Mobility in Rural India 
 Patrilineal States vs. Matrilineal States (Age 18-30) 
 LINEAR CEF QUADRATIC CEF 
   
 Sons (S) 
Daughters 
(D) 




 Patrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.418 0.492 0.078 0.474 0.605 0.136 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.025) (0.029) (0.034) ?̂?2    -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) ?̂?0 7.244 4.311 -2.078 7.195 4.229 -2.111 
 (0.119) (0.129) (0.082) (0.122) (0.129) (0.088) 
N 12799 12474 25273 12799 12474 25273 
 Matrilineal States in India 
  ?̂?1 0.469 0.543 0.074 0.681 0.822 0.139 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.102) (0.095) (0.107) ?̂?2    -0.017 -0.024 -0.007 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) ?̂?0 7.209 6.872 -0.198 6.868 6.557 -0.175 
 (0.455) (0.431) (0.310) (0.482) (0.453) (0.340) 
N 925 834 1759 925 834 1759 
Notes: (1) The data used are from the IHDS 2012 round with children aged 18-30.   The dependent variable in 
the regression is children’s years of schooling. Number of children in a household is controlled in each 
regression. (2)  The patrilineal and matrilineal classification follows that of Jayachandran and Pande (2017). 
(3) ?̂?1 is the estimated linear coefficient in the mobility equation, ?̂?2 is the estimated quadratic coefficient in 
the mobility equation, and ?̂?0  is the estimated intercept in the mobility equation. N is the number of 
observations. 
